regarding the tenets upheld by Zeno of' Elea and the purpose of his treatise as a whole.
Although by no means abundant, the verbatim fragments, the second-hand reports about his arguments, and the statements defining his philosophical intention are considered an adequate basis for definite conclusions.
The paper hereby submitted does not aim at replacing one theory by another but has the more modest objective of examining the eVidence on which the commu nis opinio so confidently rests and to show how .much has been too readily accepted as certain .
We shall begin with questions and shall end up not with positive answers but with other questions.
Every comprehensive treatment of Ze.,no uses as starting point the discussion between Socrates and Zeno at the beginning of Plato's Pe.rme.l'lides (127d6-128e4). This well known section informs us that Ze n o wrote his treatise in defense of Pannenides' thesis and wrote it against the 11de tractorst1 of Parmenides. The master had proved EV Er va 4 the faithful disciple supported him by proving in each of his arguments (or bY;oo,t he. §.ej. §.)
wb 0 U}(. E O .. t' I, no A.A.a ( ib. 127e9f.; 12Sa8ff 0).
Plato must know: consensus on this point seems so general that it is almost a sacrilege to question the validity of his "statement11-at least of its substance; some details are readily dismissed. Plato, it seems to be held, was in a position to form a judgment and had no reason for deceiving his readers; moreover, as Hermann Frankel has argued, the mixture of jest and $eriousness characteristic of Zeno us r easoning was particularly congenial to Plato; therefore he, if anyone, would be in an excellent position to understand Zeno's subtle playfulness.
Vlastos and Guthrie refuse to find in Zeno the specific kind of humor which Frankel has noticed; it may also be asked whether Plato's own humor was not of a more gentle and amiable kind -asteign.
Still in principle Frankel's argument, based as it is on congeniality of temperaments, has more to be said for it than the approach of others who without a moment's hesitation credit Plato with interests typical of' a modern historian of philosophy. Yet what Plato in his dialogues reports a.bout his philosophical precursors is almost invariably determined . .
by the specific problem and context for which he refers to them. How onesided, not to say distorted, would be the impression which the dialogues roughly contemporary with the Parmenides would give us of Heraclitus: mnta rhei. would appear to be the es sence of his philosophyo Dealing with
Parmenides or the Eleatics as a group, Plato in accordance with the trend of his own argument , treats on some occasions the "one," on others "being"
and the rejection of' "non-being," on still others the "immovable" qua.lity
of the "one" as the essence of their philosophy (�. 12Sa.ff . ; Sopl!• 242d; 237arr.; Theaet. 180e).
Further illustrations would be available but it may suffice to say that Plato's attitude to earlier thinkers is that of a productive philosopher who finds in his precursors whatever suits his own thought, not at all that of a philological and historical interpre�ere Returning to our section in the Parmenides we may notice some unique
features$
This time Plato makes as clear as we could wish that Socrates arrives at his conclustons by a process of inference. He proceeds 122 detemntim; the steps, i.e. the individual hypotheses, each of them resting on the preceding, are clearly marked (127e4, the .first, would hardly be disputed; e8-10; 10-1.3; 128a.6-bl0),. as �WV A6ywv au�wv &�ava�6v �L Kat ay�pwv na�o� EV nµtv.
In the latter parts of the Parmenides we follow with bewilderment Plato's experimentation with a great variety of hypot heses concerning the One and the many. Although his interest in these concepts antedates his acdeptance of the Eleatic ontology, he evidently-and with some right--considered it an Eleatic theme, and probably wrote the Parmenides to clarify his own attitude to the alternative "One or many," just as in other dialogues of this period he investigates the Eleatic alternative of Being and non-Being , Rest and Movement . If this was his intention� i.e. the "purpose" which we have been urged not to forget-it would be artificial to separate the emphasis on "One" and "ma.ey11 in the initial section from the later developments of the dialogue. 
6
' s:: ). ,, ' S:: ). , xa ou'tw<; av T')uf) 'tu npooyLv µEvov ouu�v £LT).
anoyevdµEvov."(6) xat -caui;a ouxt i;o �v avaLpwv 6 Znvwv AEYEL, aAA' O'tL µEyE&o<; EXEL EKaO�OV -r;wv 'JtOAAWV xat an£Cpwv (2) The former sentence has no value as testimony, since Zeno knew nothing of the Aristotelian categories (to which the adjective categorikos refers) and whether or not he was interested in "points," the stigme as here used goes back to Aristotle's exegesis of Zeno's argument in Metaphys. B4.100lb7-13. The second sentence, even if known to Eudemus from the same source, is nevertheless a reliable summa ry of Zeno-1a argument, which we shall discuss later when we have become acquainted with Zeno's own words and their context.
(3) A half-hearted admission that Zeno may have attacked "the One" as well as "the many."
(4) The familiar melody (S. here works his way back to the "orthodox" opinion) .
(5) A summa ry of 29Bl D.-K. We shall study this fragment presently.
(6) = 29B2. As Simplicius himself says, it formed part of the same fragment as 29Bl.
It has for some ti m e been included in the reconstruction of this fragment and we shall examine it when turning to the fragment.
(7) W e know that on the over-all theory to which Simplicius is commi tted, Zeno must on no account attack the One but on the contrary defend it.
This must be borne in mind when we read the first clause.
As exegesis of Zeno's text it is wrong; for as w e shall see, Zeno does present an argument fatal for the hen--or some hen, to put the matter cautiously.
If on the other hand Simplicius thinks of Zeno's ultimate purpose, the remaining part of this sentence is wrong, even though it sunnn arizes Zeno's next step in the argument ( see the reconstruction and discussion below). But in truth Zeno has more to say about ta pglla. That each of them has "size" is only one half of his argu m ent; the other half of it leads to the opposite conclusion, and as Simplicius himself has assured us, Zeno's purpose was to show up contradictions involved in the assUl'll pti on that "the many area"
(8) If we combine the content of this and the preceding assertion, the contradiction does emerge. But the preceding sentence remains mis- OV'tWV 'tu e v --the opinion which Simplicius is so desperately anxious to refut e�more than is commonly admitt ed can be said, and it would be well to give the arguments in favor of it a readier hearing.
One reason why anyone might hesitate to find for "so small as to have no size" in d) a basis in t he i:mm ediately preceding sentence of c) is that while it is easy and perfectly correct to envisage the pa rt s emerging in c) as becoming small and progressively smaller, they yet will never reach the nil magnitude, as Zeno himself seems to recognize by ruling out an eschaton.
Surely if Zeno almost immediately after affirming this1spoke of 11no size" as final result, he committed what Vlastos has rightly called a "logical gaffe."
On the other hand "no size " is reached in a), but how? All we know is that "self-identity" and "one" were way stations.
While there is no evidence as to how Zeno went from "one" to "no size"
and the best hypothesis is to posit the "indivisibility" of the one as the link, other ways too are conceivable, but how could smallness figure in this argument?
Yet the " gaffe" of which Zeno is guilty if in p assin g from c) to d ) he allowed smallness to end in "no size" is somehow balanced by the other gaffe which he by general consensus committed by allowing the megethos of c), which becomes bigger and bigger only in relati on to the emerging subdivisions, to end as "infinity." There is a certain symm etry about these two logical errors, and the reader will not fail to perceive this symm etry in Zeno's actual phrasing, when in his first conclusion he contents himself with "large" and "small"-both correctly deducible from c)-and then carries both of them to extremes, neither of which is any longer legitimate.
Thus serious mistakes are present on either of the two possible interpretations.
Less serious may be another point.
Unless Simplicius misleads us completely, ov6ev f:xe:t. µ.t y e:.S.o<; in a2 ) must mean "nothing has size." This is not the same as the con clusion formulated ind ) , where "no size" is by no means asserted of all l2.,0lla�or if it is asserted, this would be one more gaffe; it surely is more charitable to understand Zeno here as allowing entities to be large and small and introducing 11no size" as ail extreme of "small" (we need not ask of what it is predicated; presumably any such item would ce ase to "be"). Who likes may notice that while Zeno's actual text ind) expresses "no size" by me ,megethos' Simplicius I report renders this point (in the sentence before ; ) by meden,megetho §, a trifling inaccuracy no doubt, and yet it result s in increas:ing the similarity between this clause in d) and the words ouden.megethos in his paraphrase of a) at the very end of the section we have presented.
Small and of little weight as this observation is, it yet may serve as a warning against delivering ourselves too readily into the hands of
Simplicius.
This has some bearing on the next question I wish to raise.
According to Simplicius in the section copied above Zeno showed in a)
that "each of the many" is identica,l with itself, is one and has no size ( even if for the la.st proposition he changed his phrasing slightlyf while in c ) he showed that "each of the many ha s size. " ·Following closely upon one another, the se two items in his report favor or even suggest the interpretation of the entire fragment which contemporary scholars have adopted.
The symm et ry makes this interpretation almost inevitable, especially since in both sentences we find the words hekaston ton poll�.
Still the symm etry may only be appa rent. We have Zeno's own text only for c), not for a ) and when looking at c ) we find in it the word hekaston �ut not ton pollon. Thinking that they were germane to Zeno's meaning,
Simplicius may have extracted the se two words from d ) ; yet whatever prompted him, it would surely be rash if on his authority we as sumed the words hekaston ton poll9n actually to occur in a). 18.rge also by modern scholars to b) and the opening words of c). The y show a considerable concern with einai.
The argument by which in b)
what has no siz e is ruled out of existence is decidedly elaborate, and as soon as � is reintroduced at the beginning of c ) we evidently find ourselves on a new basi s for the ensuing argumentation.
Thus it would �exempli gratia�be conceivable that Zeno's entire argument, focusing on
"being and what is" would begin by proving whatever "is" to be "one,"
then argue the "one"--or, perhaps more correctly, whatever is "one11-out of existence, next since 'tO ov ouo' av E i11 would seem intolerable, Actually Zeno would on this hypothes�s have practiced his habitual demonstration of ta enantia not only for "the ma.ny" but he would in a more comprehensive manner have proved first the as sumption of a "one" to be impossible and then meted out the same fate to the assumption of the polla ( or, more exactly of the existence of ta poJ.la; for as I wish to suggest, einai and .sm are important through out the argument ) . I do not at all maintain that the reconstruction here attempted must be correct; still less do I Wish to di scourage other attempts.
On the contrary I should encourage them; for while none may be cogent, the thesis which so far has enjoyed a monopoly, scil. that from the first word to the last Zeno's concern is with "the manyt1 ought to be put to a more severe test.
It may be true but it is dangerous to take its truth for granted.
Another difficulty for the prevailing interpretation of this fragment may be found in a passage of Simplicius separated by barely a page from that quoted in full above. Here (in Phzs. 14i.lff . ; esp .. 9ff.) Simplicius'
immediate obJective is to prove Zeno ' s use of "dichotomy." To establish his point he quotes two arguments by 'Which Zeno proved the "quantitative infinite" in the sense of an infinite mult5.tude arising in the progress of division.
Having adduced BJ he proceeds to the argument which engages us.
His first words are npo&E:C�ac; y a p O'tl. "El µfi exo1. µlyE-&o<;; 'to
Now follows wha
Zeno epagei, namely the text of c) and d ) as copied by us above. After :finishing the quotation Simplicius feels moved once more to protest against Alexander•s allegation that Zeno wished to refute the i'One." His real purpose was to "strengthen
Parmenides doctrine" about the One and to refute "the many" through "the contradictions which arise for those positing them" ('tit' 'tcXVO:V't' Ca ouµ�a C VE L v 'tot' c; uno't 1.-0-E µ£ vo 1. c;). We naturally wonder where such a contradiction here materializes.
Ob'Yiously it is formulated in d)
but does c) alone this time suffice as basis for the conclusion dra'W'Il in d )? � inclination would be to think so. As an alternative we might suppose that Zeno being primarily concerned with the subject of dichot� allows himself some carelessness in the matter of "the contradictions."
Also a friendly critic has suggested to me that the words introduced by prodeixa� should be taken into consideration and that combined with c) they would produce the contradiction. Consideration should certainly be given to this possibility, even though without this brief introduction the first three words of c) would be difficult to understand and this may be the reason why Simplicius provides the introduction. Moreover worded as it is, the introduction would hardly furnish the best basis for "small so as to have no size" in d), for a�rt from referring to iQ..jm , �ot to "the many," it takes "no size" for granted and acquaints us with some dire consequences of this condition. 
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Whatever the solution, acceptance of Plato's testimony in the �armenj,del raises more problems than has eonnn only been realized$ In spite of the s e problems Plato's divinatio may yet have hit the truth but to have thi s confidence involves an act of faith.
If anyone wonders what other theory we�with our very limited means--may put forward r�garding Zeno•s treatise, he may take notice of the fact that in the Phaedrus Plato mentions
Zeno not in the compaJlY' of other philosophers but of rhetoricians like Thrasymachus, The9C1orus and Gorgias . We instinctively rebel aga�nst finding him class ed with men whose ambition was to est�blish a hold on people's minds by dazzling them, swaying them, and if necessary even deceiving them;
for we are wont to consider Zeno a thinker of high order am originality whose discoveries �ave been called immeasurably profound and whose problems and diletnmas deeply influenced the subsequent dev�1opments of philosophy.
Still, granting �11 o� this and admitting also that Plato in the Parmenides had every right to wonder about the "intention" of Zeno's treatise--for whatever is "Written reflects some kind of intention on the part of it s author-Plato may yet prejudice the inquiry by expecting the intention to relate to a definite philosophical position and by insisting that the con clusions of all individual arguments converged in this direction.
Zeno, to
judge from what little we know, seems to delight in intellectual experimen tation, in the discovery and exploitation of new argu:rnentative methods.
Problems, dilemmas, paradoxes, equally defensible alternatives may have fascinated him more for their own sake than for that of a resolution and positive "results." In the devising of new methods am argumentative techniques he remains a pioneer ; here lies his main achievement. That for th� application of this unique gift he found a fertile ground in the con tempora.ry philosophical situation, or to 'be specific, in Parmenides ' challenge t9 all earlier physikoi would be natural even if Elea had not been hts·city and if critical reactions to Pa?'Jll enides had not kept the issues alivee 
